Waiver of The Attorney: Client and Physician-Patient Privileges by Ball, Vaughn C.
Waiver of The Attorney - Client and
Physician-Patient Privileges
BY VAUGHN C. BALL*
In common with a majority of the states, Ohio has had for
many years a statute providing that communications between at-
torney and client and between physician and patient shall be privi-
leged from disclosure in court. Section 2317.02 of the Revised Code
contains the Ohio version.'
By the enactment of Amended House Bill No. 576, effective
October 13, 1953, the 100th General Assembly amended this por-
tion of Section 2317.02 to read as follows: (amendment in italics):
See. 2317.02 (11494). The following persons shall not
testify in certain respects:
(A) An attorney, concerning a communication made
to him by his client in that relation or his advice to his
client; or a physician, concerning a communication made
to him by his patient in that relation, or his advice to his
patient; but the attorney or physician may testify by ex-
press consent of the client or patient, or if the client or pa-
tient be deceased, by the express consent of the surviving
spouse or the executor or administrator of the estate of
such deceased client or patient; and if the client or patient
voluntarily testifies, the attorney or physician may be
compelled to testify on the same subject; ...
The old statute presented some difficulty in application. Ohio
stands with the large number of courts which have held that a
litigant can complain on appeal of the erroneous admission of
privileged matter over his objection, although he is not the client
or patient, and in no way represents him.2 The argument that he
had no standing to complain does not seem to have been presented
squarely to the Ohio courts, and is not discussed. Legal writers,
who have severely critized the whole idea of these privileges for
many years, have criticized also this position as to the reviewability
of their denial. In jurisdictions which retain them, the aim of these
privileges is now usually said to be: to encourage the client or pa-
tient to make full and free disclosure to his attorney or physician
of facts necessary to proper advice, without fear that any humili-
ating, degrading or incriminating ones will be later disclosed in
* Associate Professor of Law, College of Law, The Ohio State University.
1Formerly OQao GEN. CODE § 11494. The other state statutes are collected
in 8 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2292 n., 2380 n. (3d ed. 1940); Note, 52 CoL. L.
REv. 383 (1952).
2 Swetland v. Miles, 101 Ohio St. 501, 130 N.E. 22 (1920); Weis v. Weis,
147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E. 2d 245 (1947); and see State v. Karcher, 155 Ohio St.
253, 98 N.E. 2d 308 (1951).
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court to shock his feelings or injure his reputation.3 Here and there
the rule is, logically, limited to such facts4, but most statutes give
the client or patient an abundance of encouragement by assuring
him that nothing of these communications will, without his con-
sent, be revealed in court by the professional adviser (either di-
rectly, or indirectly by disclosure of the advice given).
In this respect the true privilege differs from the great body
of evidentiary rules of exclusion or preference, such as the hearsay
rule or best evidence rule. The latter are intended to aid the as-
certainment of the truth, by allowing the litigant to protect himself
against the admission of evidence which is insufficiently reliable,
or prejudicial, or productive of delay or confusion. The rules of
privilege here considered obviously do tend to suppress the truth,
but this sacrifice is thought (in those states which retain them) to
be outweighed by a need to encourage the communications in-
volved.
Wigmore and some courts have pursued the above statement
to the conclusion that since the rule of privilege is for the benefit
of the client or patient, only he can claim it as a matter of right.5
A litigant, as litigant, has a right to the enforcement of those rules
of exclusion and preference designed to ascertain the truth, but
unless he is also the patient or client, no right to the enforcement
of the rule of privilege. He may suggest its application on behalf
of the client or patient, but if the trial judge, even erroneously,
refuses to exclude the privileged matter, the litigant cannot com-
plain on appeal. A majority of courts, however, have further al-
lowed the litigant who suggested the privilege to complain on appeal
where the privilege is erroneously denied, even when he is not the
patient or client.6 This result seems to be due not alone to a "sport-
ing theory of justice," as some critics suggest. The litigant has no
3 McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 Tax L.
Rav. 447 (1938).
4 PurnoNes STATs. 1930 (Perma) tit. 19, § 686 (facts "which tend to
blacken the character of" the patient); N.Y. Cry. PRoc. AcT § 354, ("which
would tend to disgrace the memory of the decedent").
5 Associates Discount Corp. v. Greisinger, 103 F. Supp. 705 (W.D. Pa. 1952);
In re Fay's Estate, 31 Erie 353 (Pa. Orph. 1949); Yarborough v. Yarborough,
202 Ga. 391, 43 S. E. 2d. 329 (1947); Martin v. State, (Miss.) 33 So. 2d 825
(1948), and see Vance v. State, 182 Miss. 840, 183 So. 280 (1938); Hier v.
Farmer's Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 104 Mont. 471, 67 P. 2d 831, 110 A.L.R. 1051
(1937); 8 WirnuoRX, EVMENCE §§ 2196, 2321, 2386 (3d ed. 1940); Note, 2 A.L.R.
2d. 645 (1948); Note, 30 COL. L. Pray. 686 (1930). Ohio seems to take this view
as to the privilege against self-incrimination, Orum v. State, 38 Ohio App.
171, 175 N.E. 876 (1931), but ordinarily no problem of protecting an absent
holder of this privilege arises.
6 The cases are collected in 8 WIGmmO;R, Ev DENCE, §§ 2196, 2321, 2386 (3d
ed. 1940).
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interest, as litigant, in the sustaining of the privilege, but when the
client or patient is absent, the concededly erroneous failure of the
trial court to apply the privilege must be corrected at the instance
of some one else, or not at all. In addition, the unfortunate casting
together in the statutes of rules of exclusion regulating the com-
petency of witnesses, and rules of privilege, have tended to result
in confusion as to the function of the two.
In this situation the problem of who may waive the privilege
assumes large importance, particularly after the death of the client
or patient, who could waive it while alive. Faced with their views
that any litigant, even the adversary of the successors of the de-
ceased, may complain on appeal if the privilege is erroneously
denied, unless waived, and with the client or patient prevented
by death from deciding whether to waive, the majority of courts
have held that the privilege may be waived by his executor, ad-
ministrator, next of kin, heir, or legatee, who is considered as
standing in his place.7 Some statutes expressly so provide, but the
same result has been reached in states where the statute speaks
of incompetency,8 where there is no provision for waiver,9 and
even where the statute expressly provides some other waiver and
omits this one.'0
For a time at least, Ohio stood with the small minority of states
rejecting the above view and holding that if the client or patient
died without having waived the privilege, the right to waive did
not pass to any successor." The statute did not make any mention
of this contingency.
7 Stayner v. Nye, 227 Ind. 231, 85 N.E. 2d. 496 (1949); Martin v. Shaen, 22
Wash. 2d. 505, 156 P. 2d. 681 (1945); Denny v. Robertson, 352 Mo. 609, 179 S. W.
2d 5 (1944); Boyles v. Cora, 232 Ia. 822, 6 N.W. 2d. 401 (1942); In re Cunning-
ham's Estate, 219 Min. 80, 17 N.W. 2d. 85 (1944); Harvey v. Silber, 300 Mich.
510, 2 N.W. 2d. 483 (1942). Earlier cases are collected in notes, 31 A.L.R. 168
(1924); 126 A.L.R. 381 (1940).
8 Ex parte Gfeller, 178 Mo. 248, 77 S. W. 552 (1903) (attorney-client); Stay-
ner v. Nye, 227 Ind. 231, 85 N.E. 2d 496 (1949) (physician-patient); Denny v.
Robertson, 352 Mo. 609, 179 S.W. 2d. 5 (1944) (physician-patient); Gorman v.
Hickey, 145 Kan. 54, 64 P. 2d. 587 (1937) (physician-patient).
9 Thompson v. Ish, 99 Mo. 160, 12 S. W. 150 (1899); Groll v. Tower, 85
Mo. 249; Stayner v. Nye, supra, n. 8.
10Harvey, v. Silber, 300 Mich. 510, 2 N.W. 2d. 483 (1942); In re Gallun's
Estate, 215 Wis. 314, 254 N. W. 542 (1934).
11 Swetland v. Miles, 101 Ohio St. 501, 130 N. E. 22 (1920); Haley v. Demp-
sey, 14 Ohio App. 326 (1921); Auld v. Cathro, 20 N. D. 461, 128 N.W. 1025
(1910); Loder v. Whelpley, 111 N.Y. 239, 18 N.E. 874 (1888) (prior to statutory
changes); In re Hunt, 122 Wis. 460, 100 N.W. 874 (1904) (prior to statutory
changes); Watkins v. Watkins, 142 Miss. 210, 106 So. 753 (1926) (prior to
statutory changes); Harrison v. Sutter Street Ry. Co., 116 Cal. 156, 47 Pac.
1019 (1897) (prior to statutory changes.).
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Other jurisdictions having this rule have found it unsatisfac-
tory. In New York (the pioneer state of the physician-patient
privilege), California, Michigan, Mississippi, and Wisconsin, vari-
ous forms of waivers after the death of the holder of the privilege
have been provided by statute.12 In other states contrary early
constructions have been expressly or impliedly eliminated.1 3
In 1936 the Ohio Supreme Court, in Industrial Commission v.
Warnke,14 ruled that the widow of the deceased workman, in a
proceeding to recover industrial compensation, could waive the
physician-patient privilege as to communications between the
husband and his doctor, over the objection of the other party. The
language of the decision, while referring to the case at hand, was
broad enough to suggest that the earlier construction would be re-
jected in other types of actions and by other representatives of the
deceased as well.15
No further clear opportunity to elucidate its position came to
the Supreme Court,' 6 and the courts of appeals have divided on
the effect of the Warnke decision.17
12 N. Y. Crv. Psoc. AcT § 354; CALIr. CODE Civ. PRo. § 1881; Micii STAT.
ANx. § 27.911; Miss. STAT. 1944, c. 315, p. 540; Wis. STATS. 1949 § 325.21.13 Kern v. Kern, 154 Ind. 29, 55 N. E. 1004, (1899) overruling Gurley
v. Park, 135 Ind. 440, 35 N. E. 279 (1893), and see Stayner v. Nye, 227 Ind. 231,
85 N. E. 2d. 496 (1949) for further changes.
14131 Ohio St. 140, 2 N. E. 2d. 248 (1936).
Is The dissenting judges so considered it; and see the note in 7 Ohio Op.
568, treating the Warnke case as overruling Swetland v. Miles, n. 2, supra.
16 In Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N. E 2d. 245 (1947), a will con-
test between the designated heir and the legatees of testator, the heir in-
troduced over the legatee's objection hospital records covering testator's ill-
ness and containing matter allegedly privileged as a doctor-patient commu-
nication.
Rejecting the legatee's appeal, the court held that the hospital records
did not contain privileged matter and for an alternative ground of the hold-
ing said: "Furthermore, the contestees called the attending physician, a wit-
ness to the testator's will, as a witness at the trial, and he testified fully
on all matters covered by the hospital records. We think this constituted
a waiver of any privilege and the contestees are estopped to claim any." This
holding was not carried into the headnotes. Since the court had long held that
testator's making his physician a subscribing witness was an express waiver
as to matters concerning the validity of the will, it is not clear whether
this statement shows a disposition to depart from the older cases and allow
waiver by a legatee in a will contest. Cf. Russell v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co.
70 Ohio App. 113, 41 N. E. 2d. 251 (1941) (introduction by beneficiary of life
policy, of evidence on the same matter is ineffectual as a waiver- only ex-
press consent by the patient could so operate).17 Dougherty v. Hall, 70 Ohio App. 163, 45 N. E. 2d. 608, 612 (1942); McKee
v. New Idea, 36 Ohio L. Abs. 563, 44 N. X_ 2d. 697 (1942); Pariskey v. Pier-
storff, 63 Ohio App. 503, 27 N. E. 2d. 254 (1940); Colwell v. Dwyer, 20 Ohio
Ops. 320, 35 N. E. 2d. 789 (Ohio App. 1940).
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The present amendment to the statute makes clear that waiver
is possible by the surviving spouse or executor or administrator.
Since the legislature rejected an amendment designed to permit the
executor or administrator to waive only if there were no surviving
spouse, it seems clearly intended that either may waive without
the concurrence of the other.'8 The specific designation of the per-
sons entitled to waive will eliminate the difficulties found in some
states in determining who is a "personal representative" of the de-
ceased.19
Another question may arise under the new wording. Ohio
holds that a written waiver by a patient, inserted in an application
or contract for insurance, is effective to remove the bar of the
statute after his death.20 Also, if a client makes his attorney a sub-
scribing witness to his will, this waiver is effective after his death.21
Does the 1953 amendment continue this rule, adding another
waiver to it, or does it mean that after his death the new alterna-
tive: "or if the client or patient be deceased, by the express con-
sent of the surviving spouse or the executor or administrator..."
is the only form of waiver which will be effective, and prior ex-
press waivers by the deceased do not apply?
In New York, which had previously held no waiver possible
after the death of the client or patient, the legislature provided
that "... a physician.., upon a trial or examination may disclose
any information ... when the provisions of [the privilege statute]
have been expressly waived upon such trial or examination by the
personal representatives of the deceased patient."22
In Holden v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 23 the New York Court
of Appeals held that policy provisions for waiver are ineffective
when the patient has died:
... Under the statute as amended, no one except the
personal representatives of the deceased patient can
waive ... and it can be waived by them only upon the trial
or examination where the evidence is offered or received.
It seems unlikely that the Ohio legislature intended to make
such a change without using more specific language;2 4 and it did
18 House Journal, 100th General Assembly, June 10, 1953, p. 7.
19 In re Kings Will, 251 Wis. 269, 29 NE. 2d. 69 (1947); In re Faiher
239 App. Div. 246, 268 N. Y. Supp. 120 (1933); In re Ackermann, 163 Misc.
624, 298 N. Y. Supp. 38 (Surr. Ct. 1937); Thompson v. Smith, 103 F. 2d 936,
126 A.L.R. 382 (Ct. App. D. C. 1939).
20New York Life Ins. Co. v. Snyder, 116 Ohio St. 693, 158 N. E. 176
(1927).
21 Knepper v. Knepper, 103 Ohio St. 529, 134 N. E. 476 (1921).
22 N. Y. CIV. PROc. Ac'r § 354.
23 165 N. Y. 13, 17, 58 N. E. 771, 772 (1900).
24 E.g., MI&ma. STAr. ANN. § 595.02: "... The beneficiaries shall be deemed
to be the personal representatives of such deceased person for the purpose
of waiving the privilege hereinbefore created, and no oral or written waiver
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not expressly require waiver to be "upon such trial or examina-
tion," which phrase was stressed by the New York court. Wiscon-
sin and Mississippi have had statutes more similar in this respect
to the Ohio waiver provision for many years.
20
The Wisconsin provision, enacted in 1921, reads: (after pro-
viding for express waiver):
... or in case of [the patient's] death or disability, of
his personal representative or other person authorized to
sue for personal injury or of the beneficiary of an insur-
ance policy on his life, health or physical condition.
In In Re Petersom's Estate,26 the testator's will, making his physi-
cian an attesting witness, was made in 1940. It was offered for pro-
bate by one legatee. At a hearing on objections to probate raised
by testator's brothers and sisters, also legatees, it was held that
the waiver thus made by testator operated after his death to render
the physician's testimony unprivileged when called by the pro-
ponent. The court's discussion on this point said: 
27
The contestants contend that Dr. Schneider was by
reason of the provisions of sec. 325.21 incompetent to testi-
fy to the execution of the will and the condition of the
patient. It satisfactorily appears from the record that Dr.
Schneider signed the will as an attesting witness at the
request of the testator. It is well established that where
a testator requests a physician to become a witness to his
will he thereby waives any privilege which would other-
wise exist between him and his physician.
Although the precise argument is not discussed, this case
would seem to be persuasive as to the effect of the Ohio amend-
ment.
The statute unfortunately does not provide for waiver by next-
of-kin, heirs, legatees, or beneficiaries of insurance contracts. In
a will contest, for example, between an executor and an heir-at-
law, where there is no surviving spouse, the very question to be
decided is which of these two is really the "successor" of the de-
ceased patient or client. To limit the power to waive the privilege
in such a case to the executor will sometimes, by making possible
the exclusion of material which would bring out the facts, decide
in advance the crucial point.
of the privilege hereinbefore created shall have any effect except that the
same be made upon the trial or examination here the evidence is offered or
received; . ..
2SMiss. STAT. 1944, Mar. 31, C. 315 p. 540: "... or in case of the death
of the patient, by his personal representatives or legal heirs in case there be
no personal representative."; Wis. STAT. 1949 §§ 2325.21 325,22, quoted in the
text, infra.
26 250 Wis. 158, 26 N.W. 2d 553 (1947).
27 id., at 164, 26 N.W. 2d 553, 556 (1947).
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As previously shown, the majority of jurisdictions have re-
solved the question in favor of bringing out all the facts by holding
that where all parties claim under the decedent, either the privi-
leges do not apply,28 or that any party may waive, over the objec-
tion of others.
If the Ohio Supreme Court was in process of holding some
of the previous decisions erroneous, and harmonizing construction
of the statute with the more widely accepted position, the fact that
the amendment does not cover the entire field may not prevent
completion. The fact that the Legislature has failed to enact pro-
visions calling for more liberal waiver than the 1953 Amendment,
and subsequently enacted Amended H.B. No. 576, does present a
hurdle.2 9 But other courts have held that express statutory
provision for one or more forms of waiver did not limit waiver
to the statutory forms and situations alone.
28 Gaines v. Gaines, 207 Old. 619, 251 P. 2d. 1044 (1953).
29 The Ohio Bar Association proposal is an example; it was introduced in
the 98th General Assembly as H. B. No. 151, and died in committee.
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